

ἀνεπιῶν, which is also the word which Pollux (8.118) uses in paraphrasing this passage²⁷).

Finally, it seems clear that no definition of *ἀνεπιότης* will prove acceptable unless it enables us to understand the phrase *μέχρι ἀνεπιότητος καὶ ἀνεπιού*, which occurs twice in Drakon's code²⁸). MacDowell's translation, "Relatives within the degree of cousin's son and cousin"²⁹), seems unsatisfactory on two counts. It is hard to see why we have the abstract noun *ἀνεπιότητος* instead of *ἀνεπιαδῶν* to correspond to *ἀνεπιού*, and *ἀνεπιότης* ought to include *ἀνεπιολί* anyway. We ought to take *καὶ* as something other than the simple copulative³⁰). For instance, it may simply join appositional ideas, giving us an example of archaic pleonasm. If so, *ἀνεπιότης* includes only *ἀνεπιολί*. Or *καὶ* may join the general and the particular, "the cousinhood and in particular first cousins"³¹). In that case, Drakon would be assigning duties to the *ἀνεπιολί*, and if there are none, then to the other members of the *ἀνεπιότης*. This would accord with his general practice.

The Conditional Nature of *πρίν* Clauses in Attic Prose of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries

By CECIL WOOTEN, Chapel Hill, N.C.

A study of *πρίν* clauses in Attic prose of the fifth and fourth centuries indicates that the descriptions given in the standard grammars are not only not accurate in certain particulars but also needlessly complex. The objective of this paper is to try to simplify the analysis of *πρίν* clauses, to define the clause as a type, to determine certain norms for the use of mood within the clause, and to point out similarities between a *πρίν* clause and other clauses.

²⁷) At [Demosthenes] 43.51 *ἀνεπιαδῶν* has apparently ousted *ἀνεπιῶν*.

²⁸) The word *ἀνεπιού* is not preserved on the stone but is guaranteed by the stoichedon order and the text of [Demosthenes] 43.57.

²⁹) Op.cit., 17, followed by Stroud, op.cit., 6. In reviewing the Budé Demosthenes, J. H. Kells (CR 73, 1959, 119) says that Gernet's "translation 'en deçà du degré d'enfant de cousin' glosses over the difficulty."

³⁰) For the uses of *καὶ* which I suggest cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*², 291.

³¹) In line 14 Drakon apparently uses the singular *ἀδελφός[ς]* for the plural; cf. Stroud, op.cit., 49.

The standard grammars¹⁾ explain that *πρίν* was originally a comparative adverb meaning "before" and that, consequently, the *πρίν* clause defines the action in the main clause as being prior in time to that in the *πρίν* clause. When the main clause is negative, however, they point out, it is the negation of the action which precedes the subordinate clause, not the action itself: the actual positive occurrence of that action cannot take place *until* the action in the subordinate clause has been fulfilled. When the main clause is negative, or an implied negative, therefore, the *πρίν* clause serves to indicate a condition which must be fulfilled before the action in the main clause can take place. When the main clause is positive, on the other hand, the construction with *πρίν* indicates that the action in the main clause preceded that in the subordinate construction. The construction with *πρίν* in this case merely indicates a temporal relationship between the two clauses; it does not impose a condition on the fulfillment of the action in the main clause²⁾. It is natural, therefore, that when *πρίν* restricts the main clause in the manner of a condition, that is, when the main clause is negative, the finite moods should be used in the subordinate clause. On the other hand, when *πρίν* indicates a temporal relationship, that is, when the construction is non-restrictive, like that with *πρό* and the articular infinitive, one would expect the infinitive to be used³⁾. Having thus pointed out the conditional nature of the *πρίν* clause when the main verb is negative, the grammars then proceed in their analysis of the use of mood within the clause either to ignore completely its basic nature or to apply it only to certain cases, such as when a subjunctive is used in the subordinate clause. Their classification of the uses of mood with the clause is thus not only inconsistent but also unnecessarily complex. They explain that when the main verb is negative *πρίν* is used with the indicative to refer to a definite past act, with a historic tense in the main clause, that *πρίν* is used with the subjunctive to

¹⁾ Raphael Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache*, rev. by Bernhard Gerth (Hannover: Hahnsche, 1955); E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959); H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, rev. by Gordon Messing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); W. W. Goodwin, *The Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1889); W. W. Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, rev. by C. B. Gulick (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1930).

²⁾ Kühner, II, sec. 568, 3; Smyth, sec. 2433; Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, sec. 621.

³⁾ Kühner, II, sec. 568, 3. Other grammars, however, fail to make even this basic distinction in the use of mood with *πρίν*.

refer to a future act or an action repeated in the present or future, with a present, perfect, or future tense in the main clause, and that *πρίν* is used with the optative only in indirect discourse after a secondary tense to replace an original subjunctive or by assimilation to another optative in the main clause⁴). In their analysis, however, they fail to take the seemingly obvious, and certainly consistent, step of attempting to classify the various *πρίν* clauses according to the types of conditions. Although they admit the conditional nature of the *πρίν* clause, they fail to identify its relationship to the main clause and its combination with that clause to form a conditional type.

A careful examination of eleven major prose-writers of the fifth and fourth centuries⁵) produced twenty-nine examples of sentences in which a future indicative or its equivalent appears in the main clause when the *πρίν* clause has a subjunctive⁶), for example:

μη ἀπέλθῃτε πρίν ἂν ἀκούσῃτε. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.7, 12.

There are nine examples in the same authors where the subjunctive in the subordinate clause has been changed to an optative following a leading verb in a secondary tense which introduces indirect discourse or its equivalent⁷). These sentences I would classify as future more vivid conditions. I have noted twenty sentences in which a present tense or its equivalent appears in the main clause when the *πρίν* clause has a subjunctive⁸), for example:

⁴) Kühner, II, sec. 568; Schwyzer, II, pp. 654—657, p. 336, ft. 2, and pp. 323 and 334; Smyth, secs. 2430—2452; Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, secs. 621—650; Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, secs. 1484—1489.

⁵) Aeschines (Budé, ed. Martin and Budé); Andocides (Loeb, ed. Maidment); Antiphon (Loeb, ed. Maidment); Demosthenes (OCT, ed. Butcher); Hyperides (OCT, ed. Kenyon); Isaeus (Loeb, ed. Forster); Isocrates (Loeb, ed. Norlin); Lysias (Loeb, ed. Lamb); Plato (OCT, ed. Burnet); Thucydides (OCT, ed. Jones and Powell); Xenophon (OCT, ed. Marchant).

⁶) Aeschines i, 10; i, 145. Demosthenes ii, 27; xiii, 14; xxiii, 80; xxiii, 179. Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 3, 1; *Memorabilia* 4, 4, 9; *Anabasis* 1, 1, 10. Lysias xix, 5. Isocrates i, 24; iv, 16; xii, 152; xiv, 18; xv, 17; "To Philip" 4; v, 86; v, 88. Thucydides i, 91, 3; ii, 6, 2; ii, 81, 1; ii, 102, 5. Plato *Phaedrus* 228 C, 242 A, 271 C; *Gorgias* 463 C; *Republic* 402 B, 501 E. Andocides i, 7.

⁷) Thucydides iii, 22, 8; iv, 117, 1. Plato *Republic* 402 B; *Timaeus* 42 C. Xenophon *Anabasis* 1, 2, 2; 7, 7, 57; *Cyropaideia* 1, 4, 14; *Hellenia* 2, 4, 18. Antiphon v, 34.

⁸) Aeschines ii, 2; iii, 26. Demosthenes iv, 41; ix, 53; x, 29; x, 63; xxiii, 29; xxxviii, 24. Xenophon *Cyropaideia* 1, 2, 8; *Hiero* 6, 13; *Cynegeticus* 5, 2; Lysias xxii, 4; Isocrates iv, 173; viii, 26; xv, 290. Plato *Phaedo* 58 B, 85 C, *Theaetetus* 200 D; *Sophist* 262 C.

οὐκ ἔστιν τῶν . . . κρατῆσαι πρὶν ἂν τοὺς . . . κολάσῃτ' ἐχθρούς.
Demosthenes viii. 61.

These sentences I would classify as present general conditions. An overwhelming majority of the examples collected with a subjunctive in the *πρὶν* clause fit very easily into one of these two conditional types⁹).

Although the standard grammars state that the optative is not used in *πρὶν* clauses of customary or repeated action¹⁰), there appear to be at least four examples of such a usage in these same authors:

1. τελευτῶν δ' οὕτως ἐνέπλησεν αὐτοὺς τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὥστ', εἰσθισμένων τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῶν βασιλέων μὴ διαλλάττεσθαι (= imperfect) τοῖς ἀποστᾶσιν πρὶν κύριοι γένοιτο τῶν σωμάτων, ἄσμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο. Isocrates ix. 63.
2. . . οὐκ ἠγοῦντ' οὐδὲν οἰοί τ' εἶναι (= imperfect) κινεῖν τῶν καθεστῶτων πρὶν ἐκποδῶν ἐκεῖνος αὐτοῖς γένοιτο. Isocrates xvi. 5.
3. ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν γενήσεσθαι πρὶν ἢ . . . ἀφίκοιτο εἰς ἀνθρώπους τέχνη. (Here the future infinitive in the main clause really expresses past time from the point of view of the sentence as a whole¹¹.) Plato, *Laws* 678 D.
4. καὶ οὐδαμῶθεν ἀφίεσαν πρὶν παραθεῖεν αὐτοῖς ἄριστον. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.5, 30¹²).

Since these clauses are combined with a main clause which has an imperfect indicative or its equivalent in it, I would classify these as past general conditions¹³). I have also noted three examples of sentences in which an optative appears in the subordinate clause and an optative and ἂν in the main clause:

1. καὶ οὐκ ἂν πρότερον ὀρμήσειε πρὶν πη βεβαιώσαιτο τὴν σκέψιν τῆς πορείας ὅπη . . . ποτὲ φέρει. Plato, *Laws* 799 D.

⁹) Out of a total of fifty-eight examples I find only fourteen which do not fit very easily into this pattern. Of these fourteen textual corruption accounts for most of the problems.

¹⁰) Kühner, II, sec. 568,4; Schwyzer, II, p. 336, ft. 2; Smyth, sec. 245; Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, sec. 646.

¹¹) Cf. A. Oguse, "Observations sur l'emploi de l'optatif dans certaines subordonnées," *L'Antiquité Classique*, XXXIV (1965), p. 438.

¹²) The better manuscripts here give *παραθεῖναι*; however, since the principal verb is negative and the *πρὶν* clause does impose a condition on it, I would prefer to read the optative.

¹³) Cf. Oguse, p. 447.

2. εἰ δὲ . . . ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν . . . καὶ ἀνεῖη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς. Plato, *Republic* 515 E¹⁴).
3. . . . ἀεὶ ποτὲ πολεμῶ τοῖς οὐ πρόσθεν οἰομένοις καλὴν ἂν δημοκρατίαν εἶναι πρὶν [ἄν] . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπορίαν δραχμῆς ἂν ἀποδόμενοι . . . μετέχοιεν . . . καὶ ἀδ' ἀεὶ ἐνάντιος εἰμὶ οἱ οὐκ οἴονται καλὴν ἂν ἐγγενέσθαι ὀλιγαρχίαν πρὶν [ἄν] καταστήσειεν. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3, 48¹⁵).

In each of these cases the situation is a weak notion conjured up by the speaker for the sake of illustration and cast remotely into the future; they all appear to be future less vivid conditions. If this is, in fact, the case, and it reasonably is, every one of the sentences examined in which the optative appears in the *πρὶν* clause falls into the form of a conditional type.

There are at least thirty-nine sentences which have a past indicative in the subordinate clause and an indicative in the main clause¹⁶). The verb in the main clause in an overwhelming majority of the cases either has an *ἄν* attached to it or is a type of verb which transfers the real action in the clause to a dependent infinitive or participle, itself serving no greater function than a modifying adverb. Compare the following examples:

1. οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεπάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό. Plato, *Meno* 86 D.
2. καὶ . . . πολιορκοῦντες οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο πρὶν ἐξέβαλον ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Isocrates xii. 91.

Now, it must be pointed out that any sentence which contains a *πρὶν* clause and which describes a definite past action is a contrary-to-fact sentence in nature, for the action which is described in the main clause is thought of as being true only up to the time when the action in the subordinate clause took place. In respect to the present, therefore, which is the focal point of the condition, the idea ex-

¹⁴) In this sentence *ἄν* does not appear in the apodosis to the *πρὶν* clause. Perhaps the *ἄν* was omitted since the apodosis to the *πρὶν* clause forms the protasis to another future less vivid condition, which would require no *ἄν*, or, if not, perhaps the variant reading *ἄν εἴη* quoted from Iamblichus should be accepted.

¹⁵) Here I follow the Oxford editors in omitting the *ἄν* in the *πρὶν* clause.

¹⁶) Plato *Meno* 84 C, 86 D; *Theaetetus* 165 E; *Phaedrus* 266 A. Demosthenes viii, 65; x, 67; xx, 96; ix, 20. Isocrates iv. 19; xii, 256; iv, 11; iv, 89; viii, 68; xii, 158; xv, 318; xii, 231; xvi, 8; iv, 181. Thucydides ii, 65, 3; v, 10, 9; i, 51, 2; vii, 71, 5; i, 132, 5; i, 118, 2; iii, 29, 1; iii, 104, 6; vii, 39, 2; viii, 105, 2. Xenophon *Hellenica* 7, 4, 18; *Oeconomicus* 2, 9; 7, 7; *Anabasis* 1, 2, 26; 3, 2, 29; 3, 1, 16. Aeschines i, 64. Antiphon i, 19. Isaeus v. 7. Lysias iii, 7.

pressed in the principal clause is no longer true. The action in the main clause depends upon a condition which, when viewed as being in the past, is unreal. The *πρίν* clause sets up a limit before which the non-action in the main clause was true with the implication, which, indeed, is the method of expression in a Greek contrary-to-fact sentence, that when this limit was passed the non-action in that clause is no longer true. This type of sentence, like all contrary-to-fact sentences, shows that something is not true in relation to the present in light of what actually took place in the past¹⁷). It is certainly not a completely non-temporal usage of the indicative. The *πρίν* clause, like the clause introduced by *εἰ μή* in similar circumstances, shows that the action, or non-action, in the main clause would have gone on indefinitely if it had not been thus limited by the *πρίν* clause, after which time (i.e. the present) the action in the main clause is reversed. The *πρίν* clause, since it points to a definite time and action, like other contrary-to-fact constructions, implies that the supposition is true; these sentences, therefore, cannot be particular conditions, which state suppositions with no implication as to their reality or probability.

It seems clear, moreover, that whenever the main verb transfers the real action in a clause to a dependent construction, as many of those examined do, the *ἄν* which is usually stated in the apodosis to such conditions may be omitted. In cases such as this, the action in the dependent construction, at least in so far as it is modified and tempered by the adverbial nature of the main verb, has not been realized. It is the whole concept in the main clause, not merely the main verb or the participle or infinitive dependent upon it, which is in question. More verbs than those usually listed in the grammars can omit *ἄν* in the apodosis. Note for example:

ἀπολέσαι παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν πόλιν εἰ μή δι' ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς. Lysias xii. 60.

Regardless, however, of the form of these sentences, it must be realized that they have a contrary-to-fact flavor to them¹⁸).

¹⁷) Cf. Otto Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1924), pp. 265—268; also see W. K. Pritchett, "The Conditional Sentence in Attic Greek," *The American Journal of Philology*, LXXVI (1955), p. 9 and A. Péristérakis, "Essai sur l'aorist intemporel en Grec," *Annales de l'Université de Paris*, XXVIII (1958), p. 116.

¹⁸) Cf. Schwyzler, II, p. 353, 1 and the examples listed there of verbs which can omit *ἄν* in the apodosis.

Now that the *πρίν* clause has been shown to be a conditional type, it is possible to define the conditional nature of the clause more precisely and to compare it with clauses similar to it.

Because of its origin as a comparative adverb, *πρίν* has a distinctly negative character. When the main clause is negative, the sentence indicates that the main clause (A) did not take place before the subordinate clause (B). That is, A did not take place when, or, by a slight extension, if B had *not* yet taken place. This also accounts for the predominant use of the aorist, the tense "which marks simple and total negation of an idea regarded in its mere occurrence"¹⁹), in the two clauses. Both the *πρίν* clause and the negative condition, therefore, exact a definite limit on the main clause, a definite condition which must be fulfilled before the action in that clause can take place, one of time, the other of circumstance. The *πρίν* clause thus limits more precisely an action which could be limited in a similar way by a negative conditional. It sets up a cause and effect relationship between the two clauses, like the logical or particular condition; however, it also defines the temporal relationship more clearly and more definitely than the "temporal" conditions such as the future more vivid. That *πρίν* with a finite mood can, indeed, be the functional equivalent of a negative condition is verified by an example from Isocrates, a writer quite conscious of parallelism in structure:

οὔτε γὰρ εἰρήνην οἶον τε βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν ἦν μὴ κοινῇ τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν, οὔδ' ὁμονοῆσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὶν ἂν καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιησώμεθα. Isocrates iv. 173.

It has been stated that *πρίν* with the infinitive sets up a temporal relationship between two independent acts, with no closer definition of those acts than that one precedes the other. If one wishes to show that the positive action in the main clause continues up until the time of the subordinate clause and then stops, one does not in Greek, nor in English, use a conjunction which basically means "before" to express a limit as to duration. One must use, as the Greek does use, a conjunction which expresses the idea of "so long as" and has an affinity for the imperfect in the main clause. *ἕως*, derived from the Homeric *ἦος* by a transfer of vowel quantity, is such a word. It means "until", but stresses the action as continuing "up to a certain point in time"²⁰). It limits the duration of positive action

¹⁹) Smyth, sec. 2439.

²⁰) Richard John Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (London: Blackie and Son, Ltd., 1924), s. v. *ἦος*.

rather than the mere occurrence of such action. The *πρὶν* clause, on the other hand, limits duration of non-action or shows a simple temporal relationship between two single acts. When *ἕως* is used after a negative main clause, which is not the usual construction, it is the continuing lack of action in the main clause which is emphasized. It is not likely that a *πρὶν* clause could fulfill the function of a *ἕως* clause.

To conclude, therefore, *οὐ (μὴ) . . . πρὶν* and *οὐ (μὴ) . . . ἕάν (εἰ) μὴ* should be regarded as functional equivalents. Moreover, every one of the examples examined, except a few which present special difficulties too involved to be discussed here, can be fitted into the form of one of the conditions discussed above by an analysis which is, as opposed to those in the standard grammars, systematic and consistent with the basic nature of the *πρὶν* clause. The conditional nature of the *πρὶν* clause, moreover, must be realized if its uses are to be correctly understood and systematically analysed.

Thessalian κίς

By R. DUNNETT, Oxford

The pronominal forms *κίς*, *κί*, *κίνας*, corresponding to Attic *τίς*, *τι*, *τινες* (< **k^wi-*) are well attested in two neighbouring regions of Thessaly¹). Their origin is not clear. Before a front vowel we should expect either a labial or a dental treatment of **k^w*²): the velar is puzzling. This phonemic peculiarity has been compared with that of Ionic *κῶς*, *κοῖος*, etc., which alternate with the expected *πῶς*, *ποῖος*, etc. (< **k^w-*)³). It is unlikely, however, that we should look for an explanation to account for both phenomena: in Ionic the

¹) In Larisa and Phalanna; for the evidence see Van der Velde, *Thessalische Dialektgeographie*, Nijmegen-Utrecht 1924, 62ff.; Thumb-Scherer, *Gr. Dial.*, II, 60 and 76. The earliest inscription in which *κίς* appears is IG IX 2, 1226, from Phalanna (Fifth Century).

²) Cf. O. Szereményi, *The Labiovelars in Mycenaean and Historical Greek*, *Studi Mic. e Egeo-Anat.*, I (1966), 29, who, against the communis opinio, points to a dental treatment of the labiovelars before front vowels even in Aeolic.

³) See Bechtel, *Gr. Dial.*, III, 87ff. and Thumb-Scherer, *Gr. Dial.*, II 262.